Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Tiffany F. Curtis v. S. Steven Maese : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rebecca C. Hyde; Skordas, Caston and Hyde; counsel for appellee.
S. Steven Maese; pro se.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tiffany F. Curtis v. S. Steven Maese, No. 20090454 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1700

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case Ns 20090454-CA

in tftt ffllaj) Court of gpptate
Tiffany F. Curtis,
Petitioner and Appellee,
-v-

S. Steven Maese,
Respondent and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
Appeal from a civil stalking injunction. Thi<- judgment was entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Anthony B. Quinn presiding.

REBECCA C. HYDE

S. STEVEN MAESE

2575 EAST 4430 SOUTH
341 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 303
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84124
S ALI- LAKE Cn Y, UTAH 84111 -2707
(801) 244-5868 PHONE
(801) 531-7444 PHONE
(801) 618-3999 FAX
pm>
UTAH APPELLATE COURT
Counsel for Appellee
Appellant Pro Se NOV 11 2009
Oral Argument Requested
SKORDAS, CASTON, & HYDE

Case No 20090454-CA

3fn tlje SHtaf) Court of Appeals
Tiffany F. Curtis,
Petitioner and Appellee,
-v-

S. Steven Maese,
Respondent and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
Appeal from a civil stalking injunction. This judgment was entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Anthony B. Quinn presiding.

REBECCA C. HYDE

S. STEVEN MAESE

SKORDAS, CASTON, & HYDE

(801) 531-7444 PHONE

2575 EAST 4430 SOUTH
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84124
(801) 244-5868 PHONE
(801) 618-3999 FAX

Counsel for Appellee

Appellant Pro Se

341 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 303
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84111-2707

Oral Argument Requested

TABLE OF C O N T E N T S
Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

iii

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues

1

Rules, Statutes, and Constitutional Provisions

2

Statement of the Case

3

Statement of Facts

3

Summary of Argument

5

Argument

6

POINT I.

The trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Maese's
motion for a continuance to obtain counsel

6

A. Mr. Maese did not request prior continuances

7

B.

7

Inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court was absent

C. Mr. Maese requested the continuance for a legitimate reason

8

D. Mr. Maese did not contribute to Mr. Athay's request to withdraw

8

E.

9

Mr. Maese was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance
1.

Mr. Maese had no witnesses on his behalf

2.

Mr. Maese was unable to enforce his discovery order

11

3.

Mr. Maese was ill-prepared to defend himself pro se

11

~i

9

POINT II. The judgment against Mr. Maese is invalid because the evidentiary
hearing violated Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
12
A. Where counsel declares a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship,
Due Process required that the trial court grant Mr. Maese's counsel's
motion to withdraw
14
B. Rule 74(c)'s plain language does not permit a trial court to compel a
litigant to proceed pro se
Conclusion

15
16

~ ii ~

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177

14

Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah. Ct. App. 1992)
Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

6
1, 6, 7,8

Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT 175,982 P.2d 586

13,15

Migliore v. Migliore, 2008 UT App 208,186 P.3d 973

2,15

Pangea Techs., Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40,94 P.3d 257

14

State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, 984 P.2d 382

14

State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, (Utah 1993)

2,15

STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2008)

11

RULES

Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c) (2009)

13

iii

Case NQ 20090454-CA

3n 1111s iHtalj Court of Appeal*
Tiffany F. Curtis,
Petitioner and Appellee,
-v\ HLV e n M a e s e ,
Respondent and Appellant.
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c

\ppeijcii1.,
<

The Court of Appeal^ has jurisdiction over this matter under I tali Code Ann. 5 78A-4-

> i C E M E N T O F Tqc

,

b

laring that the lawyer-client relationship had completely broken don n, he could nut *"'fectively represent Mr. Maese. Therefore, Mr. Maese moved the trial court for a two
wvvl

i O I I I I I H M I U e lo o h l i i m iii \\ i o i i i i n ' 1 Should l L

limlm

il L e i -'I'linled M i

Maese's motion for continuance where his counsel declared ineffectiveness?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

The denial of a continuance to obtain counsel is evaluated under an abuse of discretion
standard. 1 Mr. Maese preserved this objection by mo\ wig tor a continuance. 2

1

Layton Citu i\ I suwtrr

^

!\2d 655, 65L> Utah Ct. App. 1 997).

POINT II.

After declaring his inability to effectively represent his client, Mr. Maese's

counsel moved the trial court to withdraw; the trial court granted the motion. Neither
opposing counsel nor the trial court complied with Rule 74, which required a Notice to
Appear or Appoint Counsel. Mr. Maese proceeded pro se. Where counsel declares his
ineffectiveness, does Rule 74 allow a trial court to compel that litigant to proceed pro se?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

The trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil procedure presents a question of law
which is review for correctness.3 Mr. Maese preserved this issue in his Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for New Trial.4 Moreover, the trial court ruled on this
point on the merits,5 resuscitating the issue if necessary.6

R U L E S , STATUTES, AND C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O V I S I O N S
This Court's interpretation of the following rule and statute is important to the issues on
appeal and their full texts are attached at ADDENDUM A:
RULES

• Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 74(c) (2009).
STATUTES

• Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2008).

3

Migliore v. Migliore, 2008 UT App 208, U 10,186 P.3d 973.

4

R. at 319.

s R. at 349 (Tr. 5:4-11, May 5,2009.).
6

See generally State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,870 (Utah 1993).
~

2
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i

ffany Curtis — through

the Salt Lake Legal Aid Societx - filed a Kequest for Civil Stalking Injunction against S.
Steven Maese.
s

»>• •< • • "'' " • ' 1S . Mr. Maese was served with the ex parte Civil Stalking Injunc-

tion; :•.. o dav^ laier, he filed a Request for Hearing.
I" lr I\ laese :

- )ei iaed cioci lmei its fit: on 1.1\ Is Ci irtis; si: le retained pri\ ate coi :i: t: tsel

and on December X 200K, filed a Motion le- Ouash.
On March 6, 2oi ^ Uu- trials oun m •- .. - , ; ientiary hearing on ti; - matte:. or.
1\ lard 1.1 01 ""•:--v'

s

*>• < r '-jp. lit civil stalking injunction and six days later en-

•• •

tered its findings oi fact and conclusions of law.

the trial court held a hearing regarding the Motion lor \ e w Irial, whit b r denied

:•

• —

•

•

•

' s

As the evidentiary hearing began, Mr. Xiae^e s counsel declared:
j a m a t a p0|n...(- | n llK . ,.i v ^eeuiiig iiitu ii die Court wanL, .. ,_v ,:iu ard \\\,
our lawyer/client relationship has literally broken down to the point that 1 do
not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Mr Maese in this matter,
and I t h " ^ -^ ^ e-uld agree with ihm.7
Upon hearing this, Mr. Maese promptly moved the trial rourt for two week continiidiiei 1 Inn obtain i ii • w i ii 111< i« • I

l i n liiiiil

ni I i Iciiii/c 1 In

-•

„

^

going to move forward. ^ ou can relieve Mr. Athay if you wish, but we're going to go
7

k

!' V>IA ( l r

;

2 1 1:1. Ma*- h ^ JlK>*- .

forward today. I mean, this isn't a criminal trial/' 9 Regarding this issue, the trial court
did not enter any other findings of fact or conclusions of law.10
*

*

*

Ms. Curtis based her request for civil stalking injunction on the statutory minimum, two
predict incidents.11 Neither incident involved direct interaction but both involved cars.
In the first incident, Ms. Curtis procured a hotel room to prostitute herself.12 Mr.
Maese circled the parking lot of the hotel and left immediately.13 Ms. Curtis testified
that Mr. Maese never made any gestures towards her; he did not yell at her; he did not
get out of his car; and he did not make any threatening moves whatsoever.14
Mr. Maese testified that arrived at this hotel to confirm she was staying there and
prostituting herself; that he was investigating her.15 This assertion was unrebutted.
In the second incident, Mr. Maese followed her while she was driving on I-15.16 Ms.
Curtis saw Mr. Maese's car in her rearview mirror; the car then drove up alongside her
car on the left, then in front, then alongside the right, yet did not follow her when she
exited the interstate.17 Although Ms. Curtis did not look at Mr. Maese18 she testified

9 R. at 331A (Tr. 5:7-9, March 6, 2009.).
10

R. at 331A generally.

11

R. at 1-13.

12

R. at 331A (Tr. 36:5-23, March 6, 2009.).

13

R. at 331A (Tr. 21:6-10, March 6, 2009.).

14

R. at 331A (Tr. 37:5-13, March 6, 2009.).

15

R. at 331A (Tr. 49:9-11; 50:7-12, March 6, 2009.).

16

R. at 331A (Tr. 21:14-22:1, March 6, 2009.).

17

R. at 331A (Tr. 22:12-23:5, March 6, 2009.).
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that he did not s"\ \ -er \ e, try to run her off tl: t.e road, or make any gestures ai r.a

«he

told a District Attorney's investigator that she thought Mr. Maese's wanted her to pull
over so he could talk to her; she never expressed emotional distress or that she believed
I" li !"\ laese \ \ 'anted to pi lysicall) 1: tax n 11 ler 2("i:
*

*

*

(3i L at least three occasions, Mr. Maese requested continuances for the purpose of preparing for trial, calling rebuttal witnesses, and gather ir. J-«-;<'nrnt.v:-\ /-:-i '.'••'••v.i : *1
evidence. 21 The Court denied each request. 22
*

*

*

Based on the testimom o\ one witness, the trial court concluded that Mr. Maese had i \)
committed rape, tJj committed assault, i •<
, > oirun;iu .; 4,* u distances of aggravated w ,tness tampering; and (4) had stalked an individual by observing her admitted prostitution activities. 23

SUMMARY UI ; A R G U M E N T
POINT I

In Layton City v. Longcrier, the Utah Supreme Court established a five-part

nuance to obtain counsel. Mr. Maese satisfies all five criteria and shows that if the court

18
:

R. at 331A (Tr. » : 7 March h, 2()(W ).

• K at Til A (Tr ^-2-1 7, March 6. 2(W.)
\-\i

\

• i*

..

- - 1 A

(|r

t

v

22

Ibid.

23

R. at 284-288.

.,

-

!•

: •

•

\ ; .

..

-

•••,

v

i <• \ | . , ,

.»
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had granted his request, he would have proved that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected from Utah's stalking statute; (2) Ms. Curtis never felt fear or emotional distress and that a reasonable person in her circumstances (a person on probation engaging
in specifically prohibited and illegal conduct) could not have felt fear or distress under
the conduct alleged; (3) Ms. Curtis has a severe credibility problem and repeatedly lied
to those in authority over her to achieve her goals; and (4) Mr. Maese's version of events
is corroborated by evidence.
POINT II.

Under Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and absent waiver,

when counsel withdraws, opposing counsel must file a Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel with the solitary litigant. Here, the trial court failed to comply with the Rule
and justified this by holding that its ability to compel counsel to represent a litigant is
the functional equivalent of requiring that litigant to proceed pro se. This is incorrect because due process required the trial court to grant Mr. Maese's counsel withdrawal.
Moreover, Rule 74(c) fails to equate compelled representation with self-representation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Maese's motion for
a continuance to obtain counsel.
To establish that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance, Mr. Maese
must show that its decision was "an unreasonable action/'24 which prejudiced him.25 In

24

Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309,311 (Utah. Ct. App. 1992).

25

Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
~6~

Layton City v. Longcrier, this court adopted a five-part test to determine if a trial court
abused its discretion in denying a continuance requested to obtain counsel:
1. whether other continuances have been requested and granted;
2. the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court;
3. whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived;
4. whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the
request for a continuance; and
5. whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to a party's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is material or substantial in nature.
Mr. Maese addresses each of these criteria in turn.
A. Mr. Maese did not request prior

continuances.

The record shows that the litigants had stipulated to prior continuances. Yet Mr. Maese
did not request prior continuances and the court did not grant any at his request. Therefore, under Longcrier, "the first factor weighs in [Mr. Maese's] favor." 26
B. Inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court was absent.
Here, Ms. Curtis was the only witness and litigant opposing Mr. Maese. She was a fulltime student. 27 The record fails to show, nor did Ms. Curtis claim, any inconvenience by
continuing the proceeding.
Ms. Curtis however, enjoyed the full protection of the ex parte stalking injunction in
place at the time. This protection would have perpetuated through any continuance.

26

Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

27

R. at 331A (Tr. 57:24, March 6, 2009.).

~
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~

Conversely, as discussed in SECTION E, continuing with trial inconvenienced Mr. Maese
greatly. Therefore, "On balance, the second factor weighs in [Mr. Maese's] favor/'28
C. Mr. Maese requested the continuance for a legitimate reason.
At hearing, Mr. Maese's counsel spontaneously moved to withdraw from the case stating, "I think our lawyer/client relationship has literally broken down to the point that I
do not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Mr. Maese in this matter../729
Furthermore, Mr. Maese stated "a week or two weeks continuance is all that would
be required on this."30 Moreover, Mr. Maese's counsel acknowledged that Mr. Maese
had actually spoken with different counsel in order to retain them.31 The record shows
that Mr. Maese's request was sincere and non-dilatory.
D. Mr. Maese did not contribute to Mr. Athay's request to withdraw.
The record shows that Mr. Maese did not contribute to the circumstance which gave
rise to the request for a continuance. Mr. Maese's counsel refused to file a motion to
compel discovery and a motion for continuance based on the Ms. Curtis's noncompliance with the discovery order in place.32 Mr. Maese could not have foreseen that his
requests would have compelled his counsel to spontaneously withdraw from his case.

28

Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

29

R. at 331A (Tr. 3:22-25, March 6, 2009.).

30

R. at 331A (Tr. 4:9-10, March 6, 2009.).

31

R. at 331A (Tr. 4:11-26, March 6, 2009.).

32

R. at 331A (Tr. 6:13-15, March 6, 2009.); R. at 331A (Tr. 5:1-6, March 6, 2009.).
~8~

E. Mr. Maese was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance.
In this case, Ms. Curtis's claims rested on civil stalking's statutory minimum number of
predicate incidents: two. If Mr. Maese could have invalidated either incident, he would
have prevailed. The lack of a continuance prevented this showing.
Mr. Maese was prejudiced in multiple ways that, if addressed, would have resulted
in a different verdict. Importantly, the State dismissed the criminal stalking charge.33
Mr. Maese pled guilty to two counts of Attempted Violation of the Private Investigator
Act, inchoate offenses; not part of Utah's Criminal Code. The State of Utah accepted the
facts as Mr. Maese presented them: He did not stalk Ms. Curtis, he merely uncovered
her illegal activities in furtherance of defending himself at trial.
1. Mr. Maese had no witnesses on his behalf
Had Mr. Maese been granted a continuance, he would have called three witnesses: A
private investigator, a District Attorney investigator, and Ms. Curtis's probation officer.
These witnesses would establish: that on at least one predicate incident, Mr. Maese
acted in conjunction with a licensed private investigator to investigate Ms. Curtis; that
incident produced actionable evidence; that Ms. Curtis never expressed fear for safety
or emotional distress until after criminal charges were filed against Mr. Maese; and that
Ms. Curtis repeatedly lied to those in authority over her regarding the conduct Mr.
Maese uncovered.
The private investigator would have established that at least one predicate incident
related to legitimate investigation, not stalking. The investigator and Mr. Maese agreed

33

R. at 349 (Tr. 8:19-25, May 5, 2009.).
~9

that Mr. Maese would identify which hotel Ms. Curtis was prostituting herself from and
that the investigator would then surveil that location.
The PI then would have testified that this is exactly what happened. That after Mr.
Maese discovered her at a hotel and contacted the PI, the PI observed Ms. Curtis procuring another hotel room approximately 60 blocks away. He would have also authenticated video showing Ms. Curtis entering and leaving the hotel.
Mr. Maese had submitted a hearing brief establishing his right to investigate witnesses against him; the trial court did not exclude this theory as a legitimate defense.
Next, the District Attorney investigator would have authenticated his police reports
that showed Ms. Curtis never expressed fear or concern for safety or emotional distress
of any kind when the incidents took place. He would have also established that her
"distress" arose only after she was released from jail for violating her probation; a violation brought to light by Mr. Maese very real investigation. He would have also established that in his experience as a police officer, criminals often feel distress about being
caught committing crimes but that criminals are not "reasonable persons."
Finally, Ms. Curtis's probation officer would have established that Ms. Curtis lied to
him continually; she never admitted that she committed crimes until confronted with
evidence that she did; after admitting to probation violations, she vowed to cease the illegal conduct, yet she had still not disclosed her most recent crimes.
These witnesses would have established (1) a constitutionally protected exception to
Utah's stalking statute; (2) Ms. Curtis never felt fear or distress and that a reasonable
person in her circumstances (a person on probation engaging in specifically prohibited
conduct) could not have felt fear or distress under the conduct alleged; and (3) Ms. Cur-

-10-

tis has a severe credibility problem and repeatedly lied to those in authority over her to
achieve her goals.
2. Mr. Maese was unable to enforce his discovery order.
Stalking is predicated on the theory that the stalker knew or should have known his
conduct would cause fear for one's safety or emotional distress.34 Mr. Maese theorized
that in this case, where the litigants had previously enjoyed an amicable relationship, he
needed to be notified in some way that any future contact, no matter how benign,
would cause stress or be interpreted as intimidating.
Ms. Curtis claimed that a defining event in July of 2007 should have put Mr. Maese
on notice that any future contact from him was unwanted.
Yet if Ms. Curtis had complied with the trial court's discovery order, the records
would have shown that Ms. Curtis initiated contact on many occasions after July 2007;
that in September 2007 she told him about her sexual exploits as a prostitute; that in December 2007 she asked Mr. Maese for money; that in January 2008 she sent him updates
on people they knew. Given these facts, Mr. Maese could not have known that all contact from him would be interpreted as hostile.
These records would have negated the "knew or should have known" element in
stalking, resulting a favorable verdict for Mr. Maese.
3. Mr. Maese was ill-prepared to defend himself pro se.
Ms. Curtis previously asserted that Mr. Maese is fully capable of representing himself
because he "filed a number of briefs that were, for a pro se litigant, pretty well done."35
34

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2008).

35

R. at 349 (Tr. 12:12-13, May 5, 2009.).
-11

Yet later in that same monologue, Ms. Curtis states "I mean, he cited the law, he had his
citations right, maybe he was getting some assistance/' 36
In any event, a trial attorney's skill set differs greatly from the skill set required to
write a brief: literacy and logic. Trials, by nature, are fact intensive; a trial's purpose is to
evoke facts. This is a skill set that Mr. Maese is without.
Moreover, having been incarcerated and showing up in shackles, 37 Mr. Maese could
not have prepared an adequate cross examination on such short notice. Additionally,
without the power to subpoena witnesses, Mr. Maese was at his counsel's mercy regarding case preparation.
*

*

*

Mr. Maese satisfies all five prongs of the Longcrier test. Demonstrably, the denial of his
request for a continuance prejudiced the outcome of the evidentiary hearing. With a
continuance, he could have adequately defended against the allegations, resulting in a
favorable verdict.
POINT II. The judgment against Mr. Maese is invalid because the evidentiary
hearing violated Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:
If an attorney withdraws... the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or
Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear
or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be

36

R. at 349 (Tr. 12:13-14, May 5, 2009.).

37

R. at 349 (Tr. 16:10-11, May 5, 2009.).

-12-

held in the case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel... 38
When a Court violates this rule, its judgment must be vacated. In Loporto v. Hoegemann, the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4 —506, Rule 74's
predecessor. Quoted at length, their interpretation reads:
Our reading of Rule 4 — 506's plain language compels the conclusion that the trial
court erred by continuing with the proceedings after granting [Defendant's
counsel's] motion to withdraw.... When [Defendant's counsel] moved to withdraw from the case, the trial court had two options: (1) deny [Defendant's counsel] motion to withdraw and proceed with the trial; or (2) grant the motion to
withdraw but stay any further proceedings until the requirements of Rule 4 —506
were fulfilled... 39
In this case, the trial court allowed Mr. Maese's counsel to withdraw yet failed to command that Ms. Curtis comply with the Rule. The trial court held that its actions were
consistent with the Rule; its inherent ability to require counsel to represent a litigant is
the functional equivalent of requiring that litigant to proceed pro se. Moreover, it
claimed its interpretation is further validated because it deferred the choice of attorney
representation or self-representation to Mr. Maese. 40
Yet the options the trial court presented to Mr. Maese represent a classic Morton's
Fork: Proceed with counsel who has declared his ineffectiveness or proceed alone. This
choice is inherently prejudicial and under Utah law, is a false dichotomy.

38

Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c) (2009).

39

Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 U T 1 7 5 , 1 1 3 , 982 P.2d 586.

40

R. at 349 (Tr. 5:4-11, May 5, 2009.).

~13~

A. Where counsel declares a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, Due
Process required that the trial court grant Mr. Maese's counsel's motion to
withdraw.
In State v. Lovell, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a [litigant] 'must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which
leads to an apparently unjust verdict/ " 41
This issue is fundamentally a Due Process argument under both the Federal and
Utah Constitutions. In Pangea Techs., Inc. v. Internet Promos, Inc., the Utah Supreme
Court held, "We long ago succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due
process, observing that it requires that notice be given to the person whose rights are to
be affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial."42 And in Chen v. Stewart it held that "The bare essentials of due process
thus mandate... an opportunity for [litigants] to be heard in a meaningful manner."43
In this case, at trial, Mr. Maese's counsel told the Court that he was unable to proceed, stating ".. .1 think our lawyer/client relationship has literally broken down to the
point that I do not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Mr. Maese in this
matter..." 44 After Mr. Maese's counsel made this declaration in open court, Mr. Maese
could not reasonably be expected to employ his counsel's services.

41

State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 31, 984 P.2d 382.

42

Pangea Techs., Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40, | 8, 94 P.3d 257 (internal quotation marks omitted).

43

Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, | 68,100 P.3d 1177.

44

R. at 331A (Tr. 3:15-4:5, March 6, 2009.).

~14~

By proclaiming his inability to represent Mr. Maese in this matter, his counsel told
the trial court he could not advocate on behalf of Mr. Maese in a meaningful manner.
Moreover, the language characterizing his position is almost identical to that expressed
in State v. Lovell. Due process required the trial court to grant his counsel's motion.
B. Rule 74(c)'s plain language does not permit a trial court to compel a litigant
to proceed pro se.
Noticeably absent from Rule 74(c) is an option to force a litigant to proceed pro se. While
the Rule permits waiver,45 the trial court did not use waiver as the basis for it ruling.
Furthermore, by addressing the merits of the Rule 74(c) argument at a Motion for New
Trial hearing, the trial court effectively "resuscitated" the issue had it been waived.46
Yet absent waiver, its holding in Loporto v. Hoegemann stands and "compels opposing
counsel to file a required notice and also directs the trial court to wait twenty days after
that filing before holding further proceedings."47
Rule 74(c) does not permit trial courts to compel litigants to represent themselves. A
holding to the contrary guts the plain language and intent of Rule 74; that litigants must
decide whether to represent themselves or retain attorney representation.
*

*

*

In this case, the trial court failed to comply with Rule 74(c). Subsequently, it crafted a
post hoc rationalization that is unsupported by the Rule's plain language. Accordingly,
the trial court's judgment in this matter is invalid because it violated the Rule.
45

Migliore v. Migliore, 2008 UT App 208,186 P.3d 973, (interpreting Rule 74(c)'s waiver
provision.).

46

See generally State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993).

47

Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT 175, f 14, 982 P.2d 586.
~ 15 ~

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,

Mr. Maese respectfully requests this Court reverse the trial court's entry of

judgment and permit Mr. Maese time to retain new counsel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

on this 17th day of November, 2009.

S. Steven Maese
Appellant Pro Se

CERTIFICATE of SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 17th day of November, 2009, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to:
Rebecca C. Hyde
Skordas, Caston & Hyde, LLC
341 South Main St., Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
rhyde@schhlaw.com
(801) 531-7444 p
(801) 531-8885 f

Q Ha»d Delivery
0 t j S . Mail
• Overnight Mail
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Addendum A

RULE 74 WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) An attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on
all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address
of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no hearing or
trial has been set. If a motion is pending or a hearing or trial has been set, an
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The motion
to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the date and
purpose of any scheduled hearing or trial.
(b) An attorney who has entered a limited appearance under Rule 75 shall withdraw
from the case by filing and serving a notice of withdrawal upon the conclusion of
the purpose or proceeding identified in the Notice of Limited Appearance. An
attorney who seeks to withdraw before the conclusion of the purpose or proceeding
shall proceed under subdivision (a).
(c) If an attorney withdraws other than under subdivision (b), dies, is suspended
from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, the
opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the
unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally
or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be
filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days
after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party
waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(d) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing
and serving a notice of substitution of counsel signed by former counsel, new
counsel and the client. Court approval is not required if new counsel certifies in the
notice of substitution that counsel will comply with the existing hearing schedule
and deadlines.

76-5-106.5. STALKING—DEFINITIONS—INJUNCTION—PENALTIES.
Title 7 6 - U t a h Criminal Code
Chapter 10 —Offenses Offenses Against the Person
Section 1301 — Stalking — Definitions — Injunction — Penalties.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" means:
(i) verdict or conviction;
(ii)

a plea cf guilty or guilty and mentally ill;

(iii)

a plea of no contest; or

(iv)

the acceptance by the court of a plea in abeyance.

(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific
person, including:
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils,
threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes with a
person's property:
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone
else to engage in any of these acts:
(A) approaches or confronts a person;
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's employer
or coworkers;
(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or
enters property owned, leased, or occupied by a person;
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the purpose of
obtaining or disseminating information about or communicating
with the person to a member of the person's family or household,

i_r< f'\ c \j -^ ..

By.
Cierk

Case Number:

Civil Stalking Injunction

Court: ^ i V d J ^ i S & d i ^ b
County: ^ S a l A - I ^ V ^ .

State: Utah

Petitioner (person who asked for the stalking injunction):

TT-femu
F/rsf

IveweV^

O

Out+i^

AfK/d/e

Other people protected by this order:
Relationship
Age
Name
to Petitioner

Last

Address and phone # (to keep private, leave blank):
Sfreef

ZT

City

State

Zip

Phone #:
Petit/oner's attorney (if any): j

^

b

^

Name

\

Phone#

Respondent (person who must obey this stalking injunction):

Scuftb a £0.

First

Sex

Stevm

Mftfrsfv
Lasf

Middle

JriL
Eyes

Other names used;

Mdress:H^^^U^^Od^3Q3M^r
C/Yy

•

wt

I S O

\^JM £H£

Social Security #
(only the last 4 numbers)

Hair

&yftQV~l g>c]3~iOH
Distinguishing features(like scars, tattoos, limp, etc.)
State

Warning!

^es^l^e.^n^e.n^.
Date of Birth
Race
l

Zip

Driver's license issued by (State):

Expires:

Best time and place to find Respondent:
(Time):
(Place):

Weapon Involved

There was a hearing on (date):
The Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to be heard in
the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were present at the hearing:
EkPetitioner
(SPetitioner's attorney (name): *feOotjrj&jX \\~. S V - D V - d ^ S
[^Respondent
• Respondent's attorney (name):
• Other (name)
The court reviewed the Request for Civil Stalking Injunction and: • received argument and evidence, • accepted the
stipulation of the parties, • entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear, finds that there is reason to believe that
stalking has occurred and that the Respondent is the stalker, and makes the orders below. (Utah Code §77-3a-101)
The court orders the Respondent to obey all orders initialed
on this form.

jQ You must not contact or stalk the Petitioner.

(The court fills out below.)

This order ends in 3 years on:

ftWch
Month

Warnings to the Respondent:

U

Day

±D\1-

Yer

•

Attention: This is an official court order. No one except the court can change it. If you disobey this order, the court
may find you in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime you
may have committed in disobeying this order.
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison.
• No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking injunction is in effect.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C §§2265, 2262, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)
Civil Stalking Injunction
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The Respondent must obey all orders initialed by the judicial officer. These orders replace any
previous temporary stalking injunction in this case. Violation of these orders is a criminal Class A Misdemeanor,
punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine. A second or subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties.

1

A
A

Personal Conduct Order
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress to
the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see Utah Code, sections 77-3a-106.5 and 77-3a-101.

No Contact Order
Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any way with the Petitioner and any person
listed below, either directly or indirectly.
Other people you must not contact:

X

Stay Away Order
Stay away from:
0

a.

The Petitioner's current or future: 0 Vehicle • Job 0 School 0 Home, premises and
property (list current addresses below)
Home address: _QjW tft&dt

ftj£

^ -

Work address: _..
School address: j ^ ^ U B ^ l
Describe vehicle: 2 0 b 4

•

Sf£chr\^

^

$B&il^

S\\\)iV

fq><g\j

b. Other (specify):

Other Orders (List below).^gg^^a^v

^W^

^
I CERTIFY THAT THIS
AN ORIGINAL DOCUME
THIRD DISTRICT CO
COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

DATE

^^\O-0q

Judge's Signature

Respondent's Waiver of Notice
I received a copy of this Civil Stalking Injunction, and waive my right to be personally served with the order.
Respondent's Address:
Street

Respondent's Signature:

Civil Stalking Injunction

City

State

Zip

i
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employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the person;

(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, leased,
or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of employment
with the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any other
electronic means to commit an act that is a part of the course of
conduct.
(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the
household within the prior six months.
(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological suffering,
whether or not medical or other professional treatment or counseling is
required.
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances.
(f) "Stalking" means an offense as described in Subsection (2) or (3).
(g) "Text messaging" means a communication in the form of electronic text or one
or more electronic images sent by the actor from a telephone or computer to
another person's telephone or computer by addressing the communication to
the recipient's telephone number.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should know that the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person:
(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or
(b) to suffer other emotional distress.
(3) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates:
(a) a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 11, Chapter 3a, Stalking
Injunctions; or
(b) a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section.

(4) In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor:
(a) was not given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or
(b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress.
(5) An offense of stalking may be prosecuted under this section in any jurisdiction
where one or more of the acts that is part of the course of conduct was initiated or
caused an effect on the victim.
(6) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor:
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 11, Chapter
3a, Stalking Injunctions.
(7) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is
substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in
another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the
victim of the stalking offense or a member of the victim's immediate family was
also a victim of the previous felony offense;
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection
(9); or
(e) has been or is at the time of the offense a cohabitant, as defined in Section 78B-7102, of the victim.
(8) Stalking is a second degree felony if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the
crime of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking;

(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of
offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under
Subsection (7) (a), (b), or (c);
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or
of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah,
would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the
previous felony offenses; or
(f) has been previously convicted of an offense under Subsection (7) (d), (e), or (f).
(9) (a) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for
a period of time serves as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction
limiting the contact between the defendant and the victim.
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court without a
hearing unless the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the conviction.
The court shall give the defendant notice of the right to request a hearing.
(c) If the defendant requests a hearing under Subsection (9)(b), it shall be held at
the time of the conviction unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good
cause.
(d) If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment
and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in
abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district court as an application and
request for a hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction.
(10) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief:
(a) an order:
(i) restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or
place of employment of the victim; and
(ii) requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and members of the
victim's immediate family or household and to stay away from any
specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by
the victim; and

(b) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with or regarding the
victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through
an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the
victim, including personal, written, or telephone contact with or regarding the
victim, with the victim's employers, employees, coworkers, friends, associates,
or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or
alarm to the victim.
(11) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved or dismissed only upon
application of the victim to the court which granted the injunction.
(12) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section
shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system.
(13) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section has effect
statewide.
(14) (a) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section constitutes a third
degree felony offense of stalking under Subsection (7).
(b) Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a
criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both.
(15) This section does not preclude the filing of a criminal information for stalking
based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking injunction
issued pursuant to Title 11, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or a permanent criminal
stalking injunction.
Amended by Chapter 199,1988 General Session

